Publications

Forthcoming


2021

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2021



​2016

The Epistemic Role of Outlaw Emotions. (preprint)
   Ergo 

Anger and its Desires.    pdf | link
   European Journal of Philosophy

 The Efficacy of Anger. 
The Politics of Emotional Shockwaves, ed. Falcato, A. and Silva, S. Palgrave Macmillan 
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​ Adaptable history biases in human perceptual decisions.    pdf | link
   with Abrahamyan, A., Dakin, S.C., Carandini, M., Gardner, J.L.
   Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 113 no. 25.

Doctoral Thesis

The Rationality of Anger

Our personal and academic stance towards anger is perhaps best characterized as intensely ambivalent. Condemned as a personal vice on the one hand, while commended as a justified attitude on the other, anger is often cast as a destructive force while at others hailed as necessary fuel for positive change. The Stoics and their modern supporters have famously advocated against anger. Nussbaum (2016), for example, claims anger is counterproductive and intrinsically immoral. Feminist theorists (Frye, 1983; Lorde, 1984; Narayan, 1988) on the other hand highlight the crucial motivational, moral, and epistemic value of anger in fighting against the oppressive status quo.
 
The liberatory potential bestowed upon anger by feminist philosophers has not received sustained attention in analytic philosophy of mind or epistemology. My doctoral thesis develops an empirically informed account of anger, and its rationality, that lays the foundations for the emotion to play the political roles feminists afford it. Four main findings emerge: that the dominant conception of anger should be revised, that anger is an effective and often constructive way of confronting social injustice, that anger, as an emotion, enjoys a sui generis relation to its reasons, and that this in turn allows anger to play distinctive and crucial epistemic roles.                           

​Available here

Articles

Title omitted
(under review)

In this paper I oppose a prevalent view on the nature of anger. 




Title omitted 
(under review)

In this paper I argue that emotions play distinctive epistemic roles.

Selected Talks

The Epistemic Role of Outlaw Emotions
          at the 2020 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society
          and upcoming at the 2021 Pacific APA 

The Structure of Emotional Content
       Center for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp 30/04/20

Epistemic Perceptualism and the Objection from Outlaw Emotions 
         Colloquium in the History of Moral and Political Philosophy:
                 The Politics of Emotions, University of Minho, Braga, 30/01/19
        Ethics Research Centre (CRÊ) lecture series, Montreal, 23/05/18

Anger and Social Justice
       UQAM Cognitio Conference, Montreal, 23/06/17 
       Experimental Philosophy workshop, Yale University, 27/04/17

Sui Generis Emotions: The Case From a Literary Experiment
     European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions,
       Complutense University of Madrid, 19/09/17

Epistemic Emotions Justified 
      Oficina de Filosofia Analitica, University of Lisbon, 11/02/17 
      Workshop on Mind, Language and Reasoning, Institute of Philosophy 23/11/15


Responses

Comment on ‘Silencing, subordination and the Mainstream Media’ by Andrew Knox, UCL Philosophy Graduate Conference, 28/09/17

Comment on ‘Slurs: Roles and Power’ by Mihaela Popa at Philosophy of Mind and Language Workshop, University of Barcelona, 23/09/16




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