

APPLICATION FORM - Study Abroad Studentships

Applicant: Ms Laura Silva	ID/Ref: SAS-2019-014
Project Title: Emotional Demands: The Expressive Domain of Emotions	
Submission Date: 20 December 2018	

Applicant Details

Title	Ms	Address	Gower Street Bloomsbury
Forename(s)	Laura		London
Surname	Silva		United Kingdom (England) WC1E 6BT
Honours			
Institution	University College London		
Department	Philosophy Department		
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Additional Applicant Details

Nationality	Portuguese
Family commitments/dependants	N/A
Justification for dependent partner allowance	N/A
Number of years resident in the UK on 7th January 2019	9

Education Details

Degrees

From	To	Degree	Subject	Class	Institution
09/2009	07/2012	BSc	Neuroscience	First Class Honors	University College London
09/2012	08/2013	MA	Philosophy	Distinction	King's College London
09/2013	09/2015	MPhil	MPhilStud in Philosophy	Pass (unofficial Distinction)	University College London

Doctoral Degrees

From	To	Degree	Subject	Institution	Supervisor
09/2015	09/2019	PhD	The Rationality of Anger	University College London	Professor Lucy O'Brien

Occupation Details

Present Occupation/status (maximum 100 characters)	PhD Candidate, Tutor and undergraduate thesis Supervisor, Department of Philosophy, UCL
Who funds your present position (maximum 100 characters)	AHRC- London Arts and Humanities Partnership

What period do you have funding for? (maximum 100 characters)	Until January 2019. After this I will rely on savings from previous grants.
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Studentship Details

Proposed overseas institution and country (maximum 100 characters)	Swiss Center for Affective Sciences
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Details of contact made with the place of tenure

I first met Professor Deonna when he acted as my MPhilStud examiner in 2015. This year we have been in touch regarding postdoctoral opportunities for myself at the center. Professor Deonna has encouraged me to apply for external funding as the center itself has no further postdoctoral funding opportunities for the foreseeable future.

This past summer I attended the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences interdisciplinary summer school and got to meet members of the philosophy research group as well as members of the center's wider research community. I think I would fit in very well with their vibrant research community.

Why must the proposed work be conducted by residence overseas?

The Swiss Center for Affective Sciences is unique in the world: a state-of-the-art modern research center dedicated solely to emotion research. Research at the center spans disciplines from philosophy to neuroscience and economics. This is the ideal location for me given my background in neuroscience and commitment to interdisciplinary research. Professor Deonna leads Thumos, the world's top philosophy of emotion research hub, hosting an incredible annual lecture series, conferences and workshops. The research expertise and projects at Thumos, and the resources of the center, make it the most amazing place for my research skill and career development.

Award Duration (months)	24
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Fees payable abroad

None

Level of knowledge of the language spoken in the proposed country of tenure

B2 level French (certificate from LAHP-AHRC)

Details of research already undertaken – list any publications

<p>Publications</p> <p>2016 Abrahmyan, A., Silva, L.L., Dakin, S.C., Carandini, M., Gardner, J.L. 'Adaptable history biases in human perceptual decisions' vol.113.25, <i>PNAS</i>.</p> <p>Articles Under Review</p> <p>'The Efficacy of Anger: Recognition and Retribution', <i>Journal of the American Philosophical Association</i>.</p> <p>Articles in Progress</p>

'Can Emotions Justify Beliefs? Epistemic Perceptualism and Outlaw Emotions'

'Emotions and the Facts that Support Them: An Account of Sui Generis Reason-Responsiveness'

Presentations (*peer reviewed abstract)

2018 'Moral Anger' at ISSAS - Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, 14/07/18.

2018 'Agency and Outlaw Emotions', CRÊ, UdeM, 23/05/18

2017 'Anger and Social Justice', UCL workshop 22/10/17

2017 'Sui Generis Emotions', UCL PhD work in progress 11/10/17

2017 Comment on 'Silencing, subordination and the Mainstream Media' by Andrew Knox, UCL Graduate Conference, 28/09/17

2017 * 'Sui Generis Emotions: The case from a literary experiment', European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions, Madrid 19/09/17

2017 * 'Anger and Social Justice', UQAM Cognition Conference, 23/06/17

2017 'Anger and Social Justice' at Experimental Philosophy workshop,
Yale University, 27/04/17

2017 * 'Epistemic Emotions Justified' at Oficina de Filosofia Analitica,
University of Lisbon, 11/02/17

2016 Comment on 'Slurs: Roles and Power' by Mihaela Popa at Philosophy of Mind and Language Workshop, University of Barcelona, 23/09/16

2016 * 'Appraisal Theory of Emotions – A Philosophical Analysis'

Poster and presentation at Aegina summer school on Social Cognition, 28/06/16

2016 'Social Biases as Metacognitive Biases' with Dr. Fairhurst & Prof. Deroy, Institute of Philosophy, 21/06/16

2015 'Affective Reasoning', Workshop on Mind, Language and Reasoning, Institute of Philosophy 23/11/15

Title of proposed project/course	Emotional Demands: The Expressive Domain of Emotions
Main/sub field of study	Philosophy and Ethics

Abstract

Although emotions are ubiquitously taken to be communicative social phenomena their expressive dimension(s) remain drastically underexplored in philosophy. What do emotions express and how? I will argue that emotions express not only an agent's subjective state and their behavioral dispositions but also a way the world is taken to be. Crucially, in doing so, emotions express *demands* made of other agents. How are such demands individuated, and can they constitute specific political demands? What type of obligation do we have to respond to emotional demands? This project will develop a much needed account of emotional expression, characterizing demands as paramount.

Detailed statement of proposed research

Emotional Demands: The Expressive Domain of Emotions

Although emotions are ubiquitously taken to be communicative social phenomena their expressive dimension(s) remain drastically underexplored in philosophy. What do emotions express and how? Basic Emotion Theory is popular in psychology and neuroscience and influential in the philosophical literature on emotions (Scarantino, 2017). According to it, there are one-to-one relations between basic emotions – anger, sadness, happiness, disgust and surprise – and their associated physiological manifestations such that involuntary facial expressions are hardwired expressions of emotional states (Ekman, 1997). Emotional expressions therefore seem to at the very least express a subjective state that an agent is in. Emotion types have typically also been taken by psychologists to involve specific action tendencies, fight or flight in fear and retaliation in anger, for example (Frijda, 1986). A second feature communicated by emotions is therefore plausibly the behavioural intentions of the emoting agent. Emotions don't just communicate subjective states and behavioural intentions however, they communicate claims about how the world is, as well as *demands* made of others, or so I shall argue. By communicating evaluative takes on the world, emotions set agents up in normative relations to one another, or shift their previous relations. Philosophers of emotion have failed to focus on these crucial domains of emotional expression.

Although empirical work is relevant to this project, the demands issued by emotions are crucially normative features of emotional expression and therefore primarily liable to philosophical investigation. What we are in need of, in the first instance, is a framework for thinking about emotional expression. This is a particularly underdeveloped area ripe for philosophical investigation. Two particular philosophers, otherwise quite distinct in their interests and approach, have sketched the beginnings of a fruitful research agenda that I aim to develop. Both Frye (1983) and Scarantino (2017) hold an analogy with **Speech Act Theory** to be beneficial to thinking about emotional expression. Whereas Scarantino (2017) sketches the foundations of a framework grounded in work in the affective sciences, Frye (1983) explores the impact of structural gender oppression on the 'success' of emotional expressions construed as speech act analogues.

I will systematically develop this framework to provide a currently lacking account of emotional expression in the social and political sphere. Crucially, I will argue that emotions express not only an agent's subjective state and behavioural dispositions, as well as a way the world is taken to be, but also express *demands* made of other agents. To do so I will need to account for **1. How emotional demands are individuated, 2. What the felicity conditions for their uptake might be (i.e. what conditions must be in place for demands to be issued and received) and 3. Whether failing to respond to an emotional demand constitutes a distinctive type of moral failure.**

According to the affective sciences, the communicative potential of emotions may be limited to the survival-oriented functions of the small set of basic emotions and their associated demands (Scarantino, 2017). I will argue that emotions have a much wider domain of expression. They can make demands in the social and political sphere, and they can do so without depending on linguistic communication. To make demands in the social sphere emotions must be able to be directed at social objects. It is a widespread assumption that our emotions can have social objects such as institutions and groups (Jagger, 1989; Frye, 1983). What are social objects however, and how do we represent them? A common view holds that we represent social phenomena by use of the relevant concepts. Emotions are often thought to have non-conceptual content however (Doring, 2007; Tappolet, 2016). Does this exclude emotions from having social objects? Providing a negative answer to this question is imperative lest we wish to deny people that lack certain concepts the ability to have the relevant emotions and issue the associated demands. We must therefore make room for emotions to make social and political demands without depending on conceptual capacities, or so I shall argue.

Project Aims: 1. Map out the conceptual space of this novel research domain by developing a framework for thinking about of the expressive dimension(s) of emotions. Doing so will make clear where this research project intersects with fundamental problems in philosophy of mind, moral psychology and **social ontology**. 2. Argue that emotions express demands made of other agents, which can constitute political demands. This will involve doing the relevant foundational scholarship

to: 3. Argue for rich non-conceptual representational capacities in emotions, such that emotions can be non-conceptually about social objects and issue associated demands. 4. Determine the felicity conditions for emotional expressions as well as the moral failures involved in their violation.

Originality: 1. Pursuing each of the above aims will result in distinct, novel and important contributions to the literature on emotions, as well as making contributions to fundamental issues in philosophy of mind (on non-conceptual representation), social ontology (on the nature and features of social objects) and moral psychology (responsibility for and to emotional responses). 2. The project bridges areas of philosophy that typically proceed in isolation, including political philosophy and philosophy of mind, thereby making contributions to the burgeoning field of social philosophy. 3. Interdisciplinarity: Although primarily philosophical, this project will at times be informed by modern research in the affective sciences, for example on a) how we perceive others' emotions, b) what cues emotions communicate in non-human animals, c) how the advent of 'cultural evolution' impacts our understanding of emotions as evolved phenomena. Attention will be paid to the limitations of the research relied upon, as underlying assumptions and methodological constraints must be attended to in drawing any philosophical inferences.

My doctoral thesis developed an account of anger such that it can play the epistemic and motivational roles feminists afford it. This involved developing an empirically informed account of anger's rationality. My doctoral work developed the firm groundwork from which to tackle anger's communicative function(s). My PhD makes a substantive and original contribution to the philosophy of emotion, as an adequate account of the rationality of emotion should take both social reality as well as experimental research seriously. This research experience as well as my background in neuroscience (UCL, First Class) and year spent in receipt of a cross-disciplinary grant (hosted by the UCL Psychology department), make me ideally placed to identify and engage with experimental work relevant to the project proposed. Furthermore, my expertise in feminist philosophy makes me well versed in theorizing about social reality and oppressive structures within them. I am therefore exceptionally well placed to conduct this innovative research project. I currently have one paper under review for publication at a top tier journal and will be submitting two further papers for publication such that by the end of my PhD I will have three potential top publications. Producing work at this level represents quite a significant achievement for a philosophy doctoral student. Part of this work was conducted during international exchanges at Yale University, and the University of Montreal. I am used to thriving in international settings and determined to build an academic career in Europe.

My host institution, the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences (CISA) is unique in the world as a state-of-the-art modern research complex dedicated exclusively to emotion research. The center spans research in the brain and behavioural sciences, philosophy, economics and linguistics. It represents the single most desirable institution for me to pursue postdoctoral work, given its thriving interdisciplinary research community. Based at the center, I would have the opportunity to pursue a Postdoctoral Certificate in Interdisciplinary Affective Sciences, further consolidating my interdisciplinary research skills. This certificate involves training, collaboration and networking that will complement my individual research and prove invaluable to my career development.

I will be hosted by Thumos - the philosophy research group at CISA, co-directed by Professor Deonna. Thumos is the world's leading research hub on the emotions, making it the best place for me to pursue postdoctoral work. It's place within CISA enables me to be immersed in their interdisciplinary research environment while allowing me to conduct research along-side experts in my field: the philosophy of emotion. One of Thumos' current main projects, 'Feel bad, live well! The value of negative emotions for well-being', focuses on the value of negative emotions for a well-lived life. My research proposal contributes directly to their research program by providing a currently lacking account of the communicative value of emotions, including anger, one of the most paradigmatic negative emotions. My doctoral work defended the rationality of anger, both instrumental and normative. This gives rise to a potential tension: that reason often calls for anger, yet a life filled with anger is likely to fall short of a good life. My post-doctoral research proposal can inform thinking on this issue, by proposing a neglected value of negative emotions such as anger, that might be central to a life well-lived: their issuing of **social and political demands**.

Referee 1	Professor Lucy O'Brien
Department : Institution	Philosophy Department : University College London
Position	Professor of Philosophy
Email	l.o'brien@ucl.ac.uk

Referee 2	Professor Julien Deonna
Department : Institution	Philosophy Department and Swiss Center for Affective Sciences : University of Geneva
Position	Professor of Philosophy and Principal Investigator of Thumos Affective Sciences Research Group
Email	julien.deonna@unige.ch

Referee 3	Professor Michael Martin
Department : Institution	Philosophy Department : Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford
Position	Wilde Professor of Mental Philosophy
Email	michael.martin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

Previous and Current Applications

List any other awards for which an application has been / is being made

I have applied for 15 JRF positions at Oxbridge, two positions at Princeton University, one at the University of Pennsylvania, one at NYU and one at LMU in Munich.

Give the value and duration of any other awards currently held

My full AHRC-LAHP doctoral award finishes this term. I have saved enough over the course of my funded years (4.5 from combined AHRC, UCL and research exchange grants) to be financially stable until the end of my doctoral program.

Awards:

2018 **Research Exchange Grant, LAHP**

Grant to undergo a term long research exchange at the inter-university Ethics Research Center (CRÉ) in Montreal, working with Prof. Christine Tappolet. £4600 plus travel expenses.

2017 **Student Choice Teaching Awards, UCL**

Nomination: Award for Outstanding Support in Teaching

2017 **UCL- Yale Exchange Bursary, UCL**

Awarded bursary to undergo a term long research exchange at Yale University working with Prof. Joshua Knobe.

£5000 plus travel expenses.

2015

Graduate Research Scholarship, UCL

Scholarship for Cross Disciplinary Training in Psychology Department, +1 year of funding.

Fees covered plus £16,700.

2014

LAHP Studentship for PhD

AHRC full doctoral award for 3 years: Fees covered plus annual £16,700 stipend

Any other matters you wish to bring to the notice of the Committee

I bring with me a strong sense of collegiality and a firm commitment to the profession. I hope to build upon the achievements and activities below throughout my fellowship:

Students nominated me for a teaching award in 2017 and 89% of my students across all courses taught found my overall teaching 'Very Good' or 'Excellent'.

I am the only doctoral student employed by my department in the capacity of Supervisor for an undergraduate thesis.

I received my doctoral funding a year ahead of my cohort and have received two research exchange bursaries throughout the program.

I have been the PhD representative since 2015 and I co-run my department's Minorities and Philosophy chapter, where we address issues of inclusivity in the discipline.

I have provided volunteer consultancy services to Alternative's Trust- a women's charity, and act on the advisory committee for 'The Philosophers Magazine', a philosophical publication for wide audiences.