

Application form mySNF

Instrument **Postdoc.Mobility**

Part 1: General Information

Basic data

Project Title Feeling Value: Mapping the Affective Quality Space

Project title in English Feeling Value: Mapping the Affective Quality Space

Research Field Humanities
Main Discipline 10101 Philosophy

Applicant(s)

Main Applicant **Laura Luz Sousa Oliveira e Silva**

Grant Application

Amount requested (CHF) Total **107'800**

Requested starting date **01.04.2023**

Duration (months) **24**

Attachments

Research plan	SciencePart_SilvaLaura.pdf
CV/major scientific achievements	CV_LauraSilva.pdf
Research output list	Output_SilvaLaura.pdf
Net academic age	Net_Academic_Age_mySNF_form.pdf
Statement of mobility	Statement_of_Mobility_mySNF_form_PM2-3.pdf
Career plan	CareerPlan_LauraSilva.pdf
Copy diplomas	Diploma-PhD_Silva.pdf Dilpoma-MPhil_Silva.pdf MphilStudformaltranscript.pdf Diploma-MA_Silva.pdf MAtranscriptpdf.pdf Diploma-BSc_Silva.pdf ExaminersReport-1-3.pdf
Commitment letter host institute	ConfirmationHostInstitute_CRE.pdf
Swiss passport or residence permit	ResidencePermit_Silva.pdf
Cover letter	CoverLetter_Silva.pdf
Other annexes	Silva_AttestationAI.pdf SILVA_AttestationAI_NEW.pdf EmailWorkFromHome.pdf Gmail-StartinginGeneva.pdf Delayedarrival_LauraSilva_JulienDeonna.pdf

1. Responsible applicant

Last name	Luz Sousa Oliveira e Silva
First name	Laura
Function (title)	Dr.
Academic degree	Dr./PhD
Date of birth	28.02.1991
Gender	female
Swiss social security number	
Language	English
Nationality	Portugal
Correspondence address of application	Home address

Home address

Address supplement	Murtal, Parede
Street, No.	Pct Antonio Vicente 5
P.O. Box	
Postcode / Zipcode	2775-073
Place	Lisbon
Country	Portugal

Address of institute

Name of Institution 1 (e.g. laboratory) *	CISA, Department of Philosophy
Continuation 1 (e.g. inst /dept.)	University of Geneva
Continuation 2 (e.g. University)	
Street, No.	9, Chemin des Mines
Address supplement 1 (e.g. building)	
Address supplement 2 (e.g. office)	
P.O. Box	
Postcode / Zipcode	1202
Place	Genève
State, canton, etc.	
Country	Switzerland

Communication

Secretariat line	
Switchboard	
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2. Contact person CH

General information

Last name	Deonna
First name	Julien
Function (title)	Professor
Academic degree	Prof. Dr.
Date of birth	
Gender	male
Language	English
Nationality	Switzerland
Correspondence address	Work address

Address of institute

Name of Institution 1 (e.g. laboratory) *	Thumos Group
Continuation 1 (e.g. inst /dept.)	Department of Philosophy
Continuation 2 (e.g. University)	University of Geneva
Street, No.	
Address supplement 1 (e.g. building)	Chem. des Mines 9
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Postcode / Zipcode	1202
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State, canton, etc.	
Country	Switzerland

Communication

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3. Designated host lab / Institution

General information

Name of Institution 1 (e.g. laboratory) *	Centre de Recherche en Ethique
Continuation 1 (e.g. inst /dept.)	University of Montreal
Continuation 2 (e.g. University)	
Address supplement 1 (e.g. building)	
Address supplement 2(e.g. office)	
Street, No.	2910 Edouard Montpetit Blvd 3ème Étage
P.O. Box	
Postcode / Zipcode	H3T 1J7
Place	Montreal
State, canton, etc.	
Country	Canada
Beginning of the stay	01.04.2023
End of the stay	31.03.2025

Communication

Secretariat line	+1 514 343 6111
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Website	
E-mail address	

4. Contact person of designated host institute

General information

Last name	Tappolet
First name	Christine
Function (title)	
Academic degree	Prof. Dr.
Date of birth	
Gender	female
Language	English
Nationality	Switzerland
Correspondence address	Address of the designated host institute

Communication

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5. References

General information

Surname	Nanay
First name	Bence
Academic degree	Prof. Dr.
Gender	male
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Correspondence language	English

Communication

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Address

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For use

Use	Yes
Remarks	

General information

Surname	Deonna
First name	Julien
Academic degree	Prof. Dr.
Gender	male
Country	Switzerland
Correspondence language	French

Communication

Direct line	
E-mail address	julien.deonna@unige.ch

Address

Address	Rue de Candolle 2, 1205, Geneve Suisse
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For use

Use	Yes
Remarks	

6. Reference letter

Julien Deonna (University of Geneva)

Bence Nanay (University of Antwerp)

7. Basic data I

Original title	Feeling Value: Mapping the Affective Quality Space
Title in English	
Requested starting date	01.04.2023
Duration (months)	24
Research field	Humanities
Further research fields	Life sciences
Main discipline	10101 Philosophy
Sub-discipline(s)	10105 Psychology

8. Basic data II

Summary

Conscious experiences have particular qualities or characters often called their ‘mental’ or ‘phenomenal’ ‘quality’ (e.g. Rosenthal, 2015). That is, there is a particular way it is like to undergo a given conscious experience. For example, smelling lavender, seeing red and feeling pain, each have their own characteristic phenomenal quality. Of our conscious experiences, emotions are perhaps those whose phenomenal qualities are most salient. Philosophers have endeavored to describe the phenomenal quality of different emotion types from a first-person perspective, relying on introspection (Deonna & Teroni, 2012; Rosenthal, 2015). The first objective of this project is to characterize emotional experience in a more systematic manner that allows greater stability and consistency.

In the philosophy and cognitive science of perception ‘quality spaces’ have been mapped for the senses (Clark, 1993; Gauker, 2017). These spaces map first-personal experiences, within different sensory modalities, along dimensions that can be manipulated experimentally. Colour quality space, for example, is 3-dimensional as every colour that can be subjectively discriminated by humans under normal conditions varies along the axes of hue, brightness and saturation (e.g. Keller, 2016). Experimental work has been used to map robust quality spaces for senses other than sight (e.g. Young et al., 2014), and used to inform work in the philosophy of mind and perception (Berger, 2018; Clark, 1993; Rosenthal, 2015). No parallel work is underway in the emotional realm. Remediating this is the main objective of this project.

To do so we must consider the potential obstacles to such a project, after all, perception and emotion are quite different (Dokic & Lemaire, 2013). Perhaps the differences between emotion and perception make the prospects of mapping an affective quality space dire. My first aim is to argue that this is not the case, thereby clearing the theoretical landscape for the projects second aim, the construction of the affective quality space itself. This will represent the first systematic mapping of affective quality space in the philosophical literature. In doing so, emotional experience will be moved much further within the scope of a naturalistic account of the mind. My final aim is to demonstrate the explanatory force of the affective quality space by determining the significant contributions it can make to the field and beyond it. The affective quality space may help model dynamic aspects of emotional experience (such as changes over time), as well as map logical and normative relations between emotions, and contribute to the epistemology of emotion. Crucially, the affective quality space may provide the most fruitful model to date of how emotions represent value. Although the view that emotions represent evaluative properties is widespread in the literature – fears represent dangers, angers offenses and sadness losses for example – systematic accounts of how emotions might do so are largely lacking (Deonna & Teroni, 2012; Tappolet, 2016). Further, as this is an interdisciplinary project, it will result in contributions not only to philosophy, but also to psychology itself, suggesting methodological improvements and opening up new research directions for empirical investigation. My methodology will involve conceptual analysis, synthesis and scrutiny of existing theoretical and empirical work, hypothesis construction through systematic argumentation and evaluation of hypotheses through consideration of objections as well as assessment in light of the methodological constraints of empirical and phenomenological plausibility.

Keywords

Philosophy of emotion

Quality space

Affective science

Language of

French

correspondence

Financial administration None (administrated by grantee)

9. Use-inspired project

Is your project use-inspired?

No

10. Re-submission

11. Link to other SNSF projects

Link to other SNSF projects comment

no

12. Available or requested funds

Do you have access to additional funds?

No

Have you as applicant and co-applicant requested additional funds at the SNSF or at another funding body?

No

13. Requested funding

Requested funding	Total (CHF)	Year 1	Year 2
Total (CHF)	107'800	53'900	53'900

Research funds	Total (CHF)	Year 1	Year 2
Research funds	6'000	3'000	3'000
Total (CHF)	6'000	3'000	3'000
Total (%)	6%	6%	6%

Participation on travel expenses	Total (CHF)	Year 1	Year 2
Entered destination (please add the travel expenses manually)	0	0	0
Participation on travel expenses	1'800	900	900
Total (CHF)	1'800	900	900
Total (%)	2%	2%	2%

Fellowship	Total (CHF)	Year 1	Year 2
Place of stay	100'000	50'000	50'000
Total (CHF)	100'000	50'000	50'000
Total (%)	93%	93%	93%

Details

Place of stay	Total (CHF)	Year 1	Year 2
Canada	100'000	50'000	50'000
Partner	Alexandre, Sayegh		

Total (CHF)	100'000	50'000	50'000
Total (%)	93%	93%	93%

Entered destination (please add the travel expenses manually)	Total (CHF)	Year 1	Year 2
Canada - - / -	0	0	0
Total (CHF)	0	0	0
Total (%)	0%	0%	0%

Research funds	Total (CHF)	Year 1	Year 2
Conference costs	6'000	3'000	3'000
Comments / Additions	Costs for attending 6 conferences over 24 months (including base rate as calculated by SNSF, registration fees, travel to and from conferences). Conferences I plan to attend: SPP 2023 (TBD), APA Meeting 2023 (San Francisco), CUNY Emotion Workshop 2024 (New York), EPSSE 2024 (Europe), ESPP 2024 (Europe), CUNY Emotion Workshop 2025 (New York)		
Total (CHF)	6'000	3'000	3'000
Total (%)	6%	6%	6%

Participation on travel expenses	Total (CHF)	Year 1	Year 2
Transatlantic travel to place of research	1'800	900	900
Comments / Additions	Cost of transatlantic flights between Europe and Canada.		
Total (CHF)	1'800	900	900
Total (%)	2%	2%	2%

14. Research requiring authorisation or notification

HRA-relevant and HRA-irrelevant research involving humans	<input type="text" value="No"/>
Research on human embryonic stem cells	<input type="text" value="No"/>
Research on animals	<input type="text" value="No"/>
Research on GMO or pathogens	<input type="text" value="No"/>

15. 3R – Replace, Reduce, Refine

Project does not involve any animal experiments	<input type="text" value="No"/>
Project involves experiments with animals that fall under the Animal Welfare Act (vertebrates, cephalopods, crayfish) and takes account of the 3R	<input type="text" value="No"/>
Project is a 3R research project focusing on "Replace"	<input type="text" value="No"/>
Project is a 3R research project focusing on "Reduce"	<input type="text" value="No"/>
Project is a 3R research project focusing on "Refine"	<input type="text" value="No"/>
Project involves experiments with animals that do not fall under the Animal Welfare Act (insects, worms)	<input type="text" value="No"/>

16. Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS)

The research project plans to use genetic resources that are governed by the ABS provisions of the Nagoya Protocol

No

17. Fellowships for a research stay abroad

Project involves experiments that require authorisation and notification. I hereby confirm compliance with Swiss laws and ethical guidelines.

Authorisation by the host institute
Type of authorisation

Yes
not necessary
n/a

18. Awareness of the relevant regulations

Relevant regulations noted and accepted

Yes

19. Diplomas/certificates/extension eligibility period

Academic qualification
Hochschule
PhD/Staatsexamen
University or college / place
Date

Dr./PhD
Other / Abroad
University College London
31.07.2019

20. General remarks on the project

Subject
Communication
Confidential

No

Dear selection committee,

I am excited to be applying for a Postdoc Mobility Fellowship for a two-year stay at the University of Montreal, based at the Centre de Recherche en Éthique (CRE). I am currently a Leverhulme Postdoctoral Fellow at Thumos, the philosophy research group of the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva. I am a philosopher of emotion working at the intersections of empirically informed philosophy of mind and moral psychology.

After a BSc in Neuroscience (UCL, First Class Honours), I pursued graduate studies in Philosophy at King's College London (MA, Distinction) and University College London (MPhilStud and PhD). I finished my PhD, 'The Rationality of Anger', in 2019 (Pass with no corrections). In it I explored the nature and rationality of anger, challenging the orthodox view that anger is strongly linked to revenge and arguing that anger, and emotions in general, can play crucial epistemic roles. I relied both on empirical work across the brain and behavioural sciences as well as on work in feminist moral psychology to make my argument. My work continues to be committed to the methodological constraints of empirical plausibility and real-world plausibility.

My doctoral work was fully supported by the AHRC, an award that I won a year ahead of my cohort while a first-year MPhilStud student, as well as by a competitive interdisciplinary award from UCL for one extra year of training, based in the psychology department. During this year I acted as Research assistant on an AHRC funded project concerned with uniting the philosophy and neuroscience of perception. I also received the UCL-Yale Research Exchange Bursary to work with Prof. Knobe at Yale University and an AHRC Exchange Award to work with Prof. Tappolet at the University of Montreal. In my final year of the PhD I secured two competitive postdoctoral positions, funded by the ERC and the Leverhulme Trust respectively. At the Center for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, I worked on Prof. Nanay's ERC project concerned with uniting work across philosophy, psychology and neuroscience on representational content, while at the Swiss Center of Affective Sciences I worked on an individual project on the expressive domains of emotion, funded by the Leverhulme Trust. My work has been published in top venues, including in *Ergo* and the *European Journal of Philosophy*.

The above experience makes me ideally well-placed to pursue the research project proposed: 'Feeling Value: Mapping the Affective Quality Space'. Although quality spaces have been devised in philosophy and cognitive science for the senses, no systematic quality space has been constructed for the emotions. This is a significant lacuna, given that there is ample experimental work that can inform an affective quality space and its construction is likely to yield innovative contributions to a wide-range of philosophical problems, as well as contributions to the empirical sciences themselves. The Postdoc Mobility Fellowship would allow me to pursue this exciting project and establish my research expertise in philosophy of psychology and neuroscience. The CRE is the perfect place to pursue this project. My host, Prof. Tappolet is a world expert on emotions, particularly perceptual theories of emotion which could particularly benefit from the construction of an affective quality space. The CRE itself provides an unparalleled research environment, bringing together researchers across 8 Universities, including specialists in fields that are central to my project. Pursuing a Postdoc Mobility at the CRE would leave me ideally placed to secure a permanent academic position in Europe, ideally Switzerland, once I return.

In addition to research, I am also committed to teaching excellence. Over 90% of my students rated me as ‘very good’ or ‘excellent’. My performance as teaching assistant earned me the only department nomination for the UCL-wide Student Choice Teaching Award in 2017. Top feedback led me to become the only philosophy graduate student at UCL to be hired to supervise an undergraduate student’s final thesis. In addition to acting as GTA, I have developed and delivered three courses of my own: an introductory course in Feminist Philosophy, an advanced undergraduate course on The Emotions and an MA course on The Value of Emotions (taught in French). I have also been an invited lecturer at the University of Copenhagen.

I have a strong sense of collegiality and a firm commitment to the profession. I acted as graduate student representative throughout my doctoral studies at UCL. I also represented philosophy graduate students across the University of London colleges on the Institute of Philosophy’s advisory committee. I am passionate about outreach and public engagement, so as to increase the impact of my research and give back to the public. I have written numerous wider-audience pieces to this effect, as well as pursued knowledge exchange initiatives and cross-disciplinary collaborations. I would bring the same commitments and values to my time as a Postdoctoral Researcher in Montreal. I sincerely hope I am given this opportunity.

Thank you very much for your consideration.



Laura Silva
Leverhulme Postdoctoral Fellow
University of Geneva
www.lauraluzsilva.com

Laura Silva
Leverhulme Postdoctoral Fellow
University of Geneva

Career Plan

I started my University education with a BSc in Neuroscience (First Class Honours, University College London) because I was convinced that to make progress in philosophy of mind one should begin with a sound understanding of the human brain. After my undergraduate studies I proceeded onto the next step of my plan to become an empirically informed philosopher of mind by pursuing graduate studies in Philosophy, first through an MA at King's College London (Distinction), and then an MPhilStud back at UCL (unofficial Distinction), which is the standard entry route for the PhD. I completed my PhD in 2019 (no corrections).

During my graduate studies I became extremely interested in emotions in particular, as they are mental states that are inextricably linked to the body, resisting attempts to pull mind and body apart. My thesis 'The Rationality of Anger' argued for a new theory of anger's nature and explored the consequences of this view for anger's rationality (both epistemic and practical). In doing so I engaged with empirical work as well as work in feminist moral psychology, where the idea that anger is rational and beneficial in the fight against injustice is most prevalent. My thesis can be read as a bottom-up and empirically informed defense of such views in feminist moral psychology. My doctoral work established me as an empirically informed philosopher of mind, of emotion in particular, and made significant contributions on the nature and rationality of anger, as well as the epistemic and political role of emotions in general. My PhD also enlarged my conception of empirically-informed theorizing to include real-world (social and phenomenological) plausibility.

My medium-term aim is to continue to produce cutting-edge research that respects these methodological commitments while consolidating my research expertise in philosophy of psychology and neuroscience. These are topics I already have a strong basis in but to which I have not yet significantly contributed to on a research output level. My research contributions have been primarily in philosophy of emotion, epistemology and moral psychology, fields that overlap with the above-mentioned ones but which are nonetheless distinct. Pursuing the proposed project will allow me to put my empirical knowledge of neuroscience and psychology to great use and make contributions not only to philosophy but to these empirical fields themselves, by raising new research questions as well as by crucially contributing to the improvement of their methods and theories. The Postdoc Mobility will therefore allow me the time and resources to establish myself in the fields of philosophy of psychology and neuroscience. Doing so will play an invaluable role in helping me secure a permanent academic job, which is my ultimate medium to long-term goal. The further steps I plan to take so as to secure a permanent position include writing a monograph after the completion of proposed project (provisional title: Emotions: From Metaphysics to Politics), that brings together and develops my research output over the past few years and the research output I envision the proposed project will generate. Mapping the affective quality space is a project in empirically informed philosophy of mind, but one that is likely to have a number of repercussions for thinking on the epistemic and political role of emotions. I also plan to apply for the Postdoc Mobility return grant as my goal is to secure a permanent position in Switzerland given the quality of life the country affords as well as the fact that it is the top location for research in my field and that I have already developed a fantastic research network there.

Through my notable track record of both research output and funding awards, I have already been quite successful at fulfilling the goal I set myself at the start of my university studies, that is, to become an empirically informed philosopher of mind. I have also expanded what I understood empirically informed theorizing to be, gaining research expertise in the fields of moral psychology and feminist philosophy to fulfill my methodological commitment to real-world plausibility. Although I have the necessary foundations to do so, I have not yet contributed to the philosophy of psychology and/or neuroscience specifically. Doing so, through the proposed project, will make me a much more well-rounded researcher, increasing my value on the academic market, and crucially putting my empirical competencies to great use so as to make original contributions to philosophy and psychology/neuroscience.

Feeling Value: Mapping the Affective Quality Space

1. Summary of the Research Plan

Conscious experiences have particular qualities or characters often called their ‘mental’ or ‘phenomenal’ ‘quality’ (e.g. Rosenthal, 2015). That is, there is a particular way it is like to undergo a given conscious experience. For example, smelling lavender, seeing red and feeling pain, each have their own characteristic phenomenal quality. Of our conscious experiences, emotions are perhaps those whose phenomenal qualities are most salient. Philosophers have endeavored to describe the phenomenal quality of different emotion types from a first-person perspective, relying on introspection (Deonna & Teroni, 2012; Rosenthal, 2015). The first objective of this project is to characterize emotional experience in a more systematic manner that allows greater stability and consistency.

In the philosophy and cognitive science of perception ‘quality spaces’ have been mapped for the senses (Clark, 1993; Gauker, 2017). These spaces map first-personal experiences, within different sensory modalities, along dimensions that can be manipulated experimentally. Colour quality space, for example, is 3-dimensional as every colour that can be subjectively discriminated by humans under normal conditions varies along the axes of hue, brightness and saturation (e.g. Keller, 2016). Experimental work has been used to map robust quality spaces for senses other than sight (e.g. Young et al., 2014), and used to inform work in the philosophy of mind and perception (Berger, 2018; Clark, 1993; Rosenthal, 2015). No parallel work is underway in the emotional realm. Remediating this is the main objective of this project.

To do so we must consider the potential obstacles to such a project, after all, perception and emotion are quite different (Dokic & Lemaire, 2013). Perhaps the differences between emotion and perception make the prospects of mapping an affective quality space dire. My first aim is to argue that this is not the case, thereby clearing the theoretical landscape for the projects second aim, the construction of the affective quality space itself. This will represent the first systematic mapping of affective quality space in the philosophical literature. In doing so, emotional experience will be moved much further within the scope of a naturalistic account of the mind. My final aim is to demonstrate the explanatory force of the affective quality space by determining the significant contributions it can make to the field and beyond it. Crucially, the affective quality space may provide the most fruitful model to date of how emotions represent value. Although the view that emotions represent evaluative properties is widespread in the literature – fears represent dangers, angers offences and sadness losses for example – systematic accounts of how emotions might do so are largely lacking (Deonna & Teroni, 2012; Tappolet, 2016). Further, as this is an interdisciplinary project, it will result in contributions not only to philosophy, but also to psychology itself, suggesting methodological improvements and opening up new research directions for empirical investigation. My methodology will involve conceptual analysis, synthesis and scrutiny of existing theoretical and empirical work, hypothesis construction through systematic argumentation and evaluation of hypotheses through consideration of objections as well as assessment in light of the methodological constraints of empirical and phenomenological plausibility.

2. Research Project

2.1 Current State of Research in the Field

Philosophers have traditionally relied on introspection to characterize the phenomenal quality of conscious experiences, some even claiming that these qualities are irreducibly subjective and distinct from any natural or physical properties in the world (Chalmers, 1996; Jackson, 1994). Others have argued that phenomenal qualities can fit within a physicalist picture of the mind (Keller, 2016; Rosenthal, 2015). Until the early 90s this debate ignored empirical findings in psychology and neuroscience. Austen Clark's (1993) *Sensory Qualities* broke this trend by bringing empirical insights into philosophy, highlighting how psychologists and neuroscientists approached the phenomenal qualities of sensory experiences in non-qualitative terms. Clark popularized the notion of the 'quality space' in the philosophical literature, arguably operating a paradigm shift in how to think of phenomenal qualities that now represents a dominant approach.

Quality spaces map capacities for perceptual discriminations for a given perceptual modality. For example, since red is experienced as more similar to orange than to blue, it will be mapped in the colour quality space as closer to orange than to blue. Similarly, as vinegar smells more similar to lemon juice than to coconut water, an experience of the smell of vinegar will be placed closer to the smell of lemon juice in the olfactory quality space than to the smell of coconut water. These similarities and differences in phenomenal qualities are ones that individuals have the capacity to subjectively discriminate. Introspection is therefore key to constructing a sensory quality space, as it is our capacities to subjectively discriminate between different first-personal experiences that are mapped. However, in experimental studies these first-personal experiences are measured under controlled conditions where observable variables are manipulated. Quality spaces result from the marriage of phenomenological and experimental insight.

Experiments in psychology, primarily in the field of psychophysics, have gathered data on 'just noticeable differences' between stimuli, so as to construct sensory quality spaces. In brief, experiments task subjects with identifying when two stimuli are different along a given dimension. There is a threshold for conscious perception of differences between stimuli that plausibly track our capacities for perceptual discriminations. These perceptual experiences have distinct sensory qualities which can be mapped in quality space to demonstrate relations between different qualities. Quality spaces are typically multidimensional. That is, our phenomenal experiences do not vary along one dimension alone. The colour quality space is typically thought to be 3D (e.g., Hardin, 1993) as is the auditory quality space (pitch, timbre, and loudness), while the olfactory quality space plausibly has many more dimensions (e.g., Young et al., 2014).

The quality space paradigm has become a popular and attractive approach to sensory qualities and has occasioned innovative contributions to the philosophy of mind and perception. For example: sensory quality spaces engender important insights about the nature of perceptual experiences that might not be attainable from introspection alone (Rosenthal, 1991); they provide a naturalistic account of perceptual experiences by correlating phenomenal qualities to empirically observable variables (Gauker, 2017); they allow us to map relations between experiences and provide functional explanations of the phenomenal character of these experiences (Keller, 2016); philosophers have also proposed that quality spaces map the representational content of perceptual states (Berger, 2018; Gauker, 2017), contributing to our understanding of the semantics or meaning of such states by mapping their content along a number of fine-grained dimensions.

Given the proliferation, popularity and explanatory potential of quality spaces one might expect philosophers to have mapped such quality spaces for arguably our most salient phenomenal experiences: emotions. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Despite some philosophers explicitly mentioning that they believe quality spaces can be constructed for the affective domain (Rosenthal, 2015; Tappolet, 2020) very little philosophical attention has been devoted to this task. Cochrane's 2009 article is, to my knowledge, the only one in the literature devoted to the topic. Philosophers have not engaged with his proposal however, such that both his proposed dimensions, and his methods for discerning them, await scrutiny. Further, Cochrane does not develop applications of the affective quality space for problems in the field. Despite philosophical work on the affective quality space being scarce, there is ample work in philosophy that will be relevant to the construction of one. Work in philosophy of perception, canvassed above, will be key to constructing an affective quality space by (relative) analogy, while work in the philosophy of emotion, on the nature and function of different emotion types as well as on the nature of emotion in general, will be central to the project (Deonna & Teroni, 2012; Tappolet, 2016).

In psychology the idea of an affective quality space is far more widespread (Roseman, 1991; Russell, 2003; Scherer et al., 2006). Two-dimensional models, where emotions are mapped according to their valence (positive vs negative feel) and level of arousal (general activation level) were initially the most popular (e.g. Yik et al., 1999). They have since been critiqued as they fail to distinguish emotion types that we are committed to construing as distinct (e.g. Fontaine et al., 2007). For example, on valence vs arousal models, fear and anger would occupy the same point in affective space, as they are both negatively valenced and can be high in activation. To address this problem, psychologists have suggested that we add further dimensions to increase the space's capacity to differentiate emotion types. Today, 4-dimensional models are perhaps most popular, where emotions are mapped along valence, arousal, power and novelty dimensions (Fontaine, 2007). Although such models are widespread there is little consensus on the number or nature of the dimensions of the affective quality space. Existing empirical work will be extremely relevant to my project but it will have to be adequately scrutinized for consistency and relevance. Doing so is likely to yield innovative contributions not only for debates in the philosophy of emotion, but for psychology itself, as this work is likely to speak in favour of some existing empirical models over others as well as result in empirical predictions ready for experimental exploration.

It is actually surprising, given the current state of debates in the philosophy of emotion, that the affective quality space is not a central topic of research. This is because one of the most popular contemporary theories of emotion is the perceptual theory, which takes emotions to be in some sense 'perceptions of value' (Döring, 2007; Prinz, 2006; Tappolet, 2016). The thought is that emotions represent evaluative properties in a manner analogous to how perceptual experiences are thought to represent their objects, that is without making use of concepts, or non-conceptually. Although efforts have been made by perceptual theorists to argue that emotions represent evaluative properties non-conceptually, these arguments usually take a 'negative' form, in that they seek to establish that emotions do not make use of concepts in representing their objects (Döring, 2009; Tappolet, 2016). For example, emotions can be felt when relevant concepts are lacking, and they do not bear the types of inferential relations to each other nor to other mental states characteristic of beliefs, which are conceptually structured. One cannot infer sadness from nostalgia, nor from a belief about a loss for example. Positive arguments that seek to establish how

emotions might actually represent evaluative properties non-conceptually are hard to come by (see Tappolet, 2020 for exception). The affective quality space could provide just the positive argument to this effect, modelling representations in terms of phenomenal qualities that vary along fine-grained dimensions, and occupying points in an affective space that resists easy conceptualization. It is particularly surprising that perceptualists have not attempted to construct affective quality spaces given that they rely on analogies between perception and emotion and such quality spaces have been popular in modelling perceptual experiences.

2.2 Current state of your own research

My interdisciplinary background and research experience make me ideally well placed to pursue the research project outlined. Following an undergraduate degree in Neuroscience (BSc, First Class Honours, University College London), I undertook graduate studies in philosophy (MA, King's College London, MPhilStud and PhD, University College London) and tackled issues in philosophy of mind, philosophy of emotion, and moral psychology. During my doctoral studies I was awarded an interdisciplinary scholarship for one year of further training in the psychology department, during which time I was a research assistant on an AHRC project concerned with bridging the philosophy and neuroscience of perception. I also received the Yale-UCL Scholarship to spend a term at Yale University working with Professor Josh Knobe, cross appointed in the philosophy and the psychology departments, and an AHRC Scholarship for an exchange with Prof. Tappolet, expert in philosophy of emotion, in Montreal. My doctoral thesis provided an empirically informed defense of a new theory of anger's nature and its practical and epistemic value. During my PhD I developed methodological commitments that continue to guide my work: empirical plausibility (to be informed by relevant work in the sciences) and real-world plausibility (to remain faithful to first-personal and lived experience).

My post-doctoral fellowships have allowed me to hone these interdisciplinary research skills. In Antwerp, at the Center for Philosophical Psychology, I worked on an ERC funded project concerned with bridging the philosophy, psychology and neuroscience on mental representation, while at the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences I worked on an empirically-informed individual project on the emotions funded by the Leverhulme Trust. These are two of Europe's most highly regarded locations for interdisciplinary research in philosophy and provided incredible opportunities for research and career development.

I have ample experience conducting state of the art interdisciplinary research. I have published widely for my career stage, in top international philosophy journals, including in *Ergo*, *EJP*, *Ratio*, *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* as well as in the scientific journal *PNAS*. The latter paper used the experimental paradigm of psychophysics, giving me first-hand experience with a scientific method that is central to the proposed project. My recent work has tackled the nature and rationality of emotions, as well as their epistemic and political roles. I have an empirical collaboration underway with Prof. Cova designed to test some of the empirical predictions that resulted from my doctoral work. Crucially, I have a paper that suggests (but does not develop) that an affective quality space might help us understand why emotions often have important epistemic and political roles to play in revealing the evaluative state of the world to agents in manners that bypass explicit conceptualization or reasoning. I have also been invited to write a peer-reviewed piece on disanalogies between perceptual and emotional experience for the *Journal of Consciousness Studies*. I have disseminated my research at over 30 international events, including 4

keynote talks, and published popular audience articles to increase the impact of my research. The above makes me ideally placed to pursue the innovative project proposed.

2.3 Detailed research plan

The main objective of this project is to construct the first systematic empirically-informed affective quality space and develop applications of the quality space for various problems in philosophy, as well as beyond it. My investigation will focus on the following three aims:

1. Establish that an affective quality space can in principle be constructed.
2. Construct an affective quality space relying on empirical work.
3. Determine innovative contributions that the affective quality space brings to philosophy and psychology.

The **first part** of the project will focus on clearing the way for the mapping of an affective quality space. This will involve responding to alleged obstacles to the project. These obstacles almost all concern differences between emotion and perception, which would explain why perceptual quality spaces can be mapped while affective quality spaces cannot. Foreseeable obstacles include:

- a) Objects of perception are, typically, out there in the world, while the formal objects of emotions, evaluative properties, are not (see Teroni, 2007).
- b) If there are evaluative properties out there in the world, they are too subjective to admit a stable quality space for emotions. The objects of perception are, typically, more 'objective'.
- c) Unlike perceptual experiences, emotional experiences do not admit of similarity comparisons necessary for the construction of a quality space.
- d) There is no empirical program analogous to psychophysics, which has been used to map perceptual quality spaces, that could be relevant to the constructions of an affective quality space.

I will address these concerns and argue that none of them pose a problem, in principle, to the construction of an affective quality space. Tackling the first two concerns will involve engagement with recent work in philosophy on the nature of value to investigate whether the mapping of an affective quality space presupposes a particular view on the nature of evaluative properties (Deonna & Teroni, 2012; Tappolet, 2016). My hypothesis is that the quality space presupposes only a rejection of extreme subjectivism regarding value, but that it is compatible with a number of moderate subjectivist and realist positions on value. On the second concern, my hypothesis is that in so far as quality spaces map *capacities* for affective experiences, interpersonal and inter-cultural differences do not pose a problem to mapping affective space. This is because capacities are distinct from occurrences, that is, everyone need not respond to an object that you find dangerous with fear for them to be capable of experiencing a similar experience. Responding to the last two concerns will involve theoretical work as well as engagement with recent work in the brain and behavioural sciences to investigate, respectively, in what sense(s) subjects can introspectively compare and contrast their emotional experiences and to pinpoint which bodies of empirical work will be most relevant to the construction of an affective quality space. On c), my hypothesis is that emotional experiences admit of similarity comparisons, albeit in manners that may not respect strict analogies with similarity comparisons in perception, these disanalogies will be specified and shown not to threaten our capacities to discriminate affective experiences along a number of dimensions. On d), my hypothesis is that dimensional and appraisal theories in the affective sciences will be particularly relevant for the construction of an

affective quality space (e.g. Russell, 2003; Scherer, 2005). The thought in these fields is that fine-grained appraisal dimensions underlie our experiences of thick evaluative properties. For example, negative valence, high arousal, high levels of control and ‘other focus’ is thought to underlie our anger experiences as reactions to offence (e.g. Scherer 2005). Work will need to be done to adequately characterize the relation between fine-grained appraisals and experiences of thick evaluative properties (Lambie & Marcel, 2002; Teroni, 2021).

Part two of the project will involve the actual construction of the affective quality space, relying on empirical work. This will primarily revolve around the identification of relevant dimensions for the quality space. These are the dimensions along which affective experience is thought to vary, and along which we hope to systematically map our experiences. Identifying dimensions for the affective quality space will involve answering the following two questions:

- a) What criteria should guide identification of dimensions for the quality space?
- b) What are the proposed dimensions for the affective quality space that fulfill these criteria?

Addressing these questions will involve systematic engagement with empirical work in the brain and behavioural sciences. I will begin by critically evaluating the criteria proposed by Cochrane (2009), the only philosophical work specifically concerned with the construction of an affective quality space. He proposes 9 criteria that must be satisfied in the selection of dimensions of an affective quality space. I expect to accept a number of his conditions – including the ‘true-scale condition’ that ‘no emotion can simultaneously occupy more than one position on a dimension’ (p.383), and the ‘fixed identity condition’ that ‘emotions should remain relatively static on at least some dimensions’ (p.388) – while rejecting others and proposing additional novel ones. For example, I will raise problems for Cochrane’s ‘applicability condition’ which holds that ‘every dimension should be applicable to every emotion’ (p.388) as well as his ‘independence condition’ which holds that occupying a condition on a dimension must not entail a position on another dimension’ (p.383). Closer attention to successful perceptual quality spaces will show these conditions to be misguided (Keller, 2016). Foreseeable dimensions of my affective quality space include; arousal, valence, control, self-other focus and body-world focus. Where existing conceptualizations of these dimensions exist, they will be scrutinized and likely revised.

The first two parts of the project will result in the first systematic quality space for emotions. This in itself represents a significant contribution to philosophy of mind, emotion and cognitive science. The **final part** of the project will be devoted to exploring the theoretical and practical applications of the affective quality space, which I believe will be significant and widespread.

In the philosophy of emotion, the quality space may help distinguish emotions from other types of affective state, it is likely for example that moods can be plotted along a small subset of those dimensions needed to plot occurrent emotions. Additionally, the quality space will allow us to plot the dynamic structure of emotions over time in an unprecedented manner, as experiences will leave a trajectory in the affective space as experience waxes, wanes or evolves. Crucially, the affective quality space can inform questions on how and what emotions represent. The quality space has an analogue structure characteristic of non-conceptual representational formats. This is because it is an informationally rich, fine-grained system of representation where representations vary continuously along dimensions (Maley, 2011; Silva 2022). This type of representation contrasts conceptual representations typical of beliefs, which are coarse-

grained and discrete. I will argue that emotional experience, in occupying specific points in the quality space, represent evaluative properties non-conceptually (see Berger, 2021 and 2018 for functionalist and holistic versions of this claim, respectively, for perception). This will amount to the most detailed positive argument to this effect in the literature. It will also contribute to our understanding of the epistemology of emotions. First, by establishing that emotions have evaluative content many think necessary for their ability to provide justification for evaluative beliefs (Tappolet, 2016), including beliefs in political contexts where emotions bypass explicit conceptual reasoning (Jaggar, 1989; Silva, 2021). Additionally, the quality space may help map justificatory relations as we might think that clusters formed in the quality space are experiences that are all apt to justify beliefs that employ a relevant evaluative concept (the anger cluster of experiences is apt to justify beliefs about offence, for example). Other geometric properties of affective space may similarly prove to be of extreme explanatory power. For example, distances between different clusters might map logical or normative relations between affective states. That guilt and shame appear close together in affective space might indicate that objects that merit shame often merit also guilt.

In psychology, beyond contributing to the fine-tuning of models of affective space, my project will open up a number of novel questions ripe for empirical investigation. First, experiments aimed at validating my proposed dimensions should be devised. Second, experiments aimed at testing conclusions drawn for the proposed affective quality space will also be called for. For example, psychologists can empirically investigate whether emotion types that appear closer together in affective space co-occur more frequently. Crucially, psychologists can probe whether proximity along some dimensions is more predictive of co-occurrence than proximity along other dimensions (for example we might expect that the control dimension to predict co-occurrence more than valence). Empirical studies of this sort are likely to inform arguments for the normative implications of the affective quality space.

2.4 Schedule and Milestones

April 2023 – August 2023 (5 months)

Aim 1: Establish that an affective quality space can in principle be constructed.

- 1.1 Tackle obstacles a-d and any additional theoretical worries that arise
- 1.2 Presentation at *CRE & Soc Phil Psych* Conference
- 1.3 Manuscript writing and submission

September 2023-February 2024 (6 months)

Aim 2: Construct an affective quality space relying on empirical work.

- 2.1 Review literature on perceptual quality spaces in philosophy and cognitive science
- 2.2 Address question a): What criteria should guide identification of dimensions for the quality space?
- 2.3 Present at *CRE & CUNY*

March 2024- August 2024 (6 months)

Aim 2: Construct an affective quality space relying on empirical work.

- 2.4 Address question b) What are the proposed dimensions for the affective quality space that fulfill these criteria?
- 2.5 Present work at *CRE & APA*
- 2.6 Manuscript writing and submission

September 2024-March 2025 (7 Months)

Aim 3: Determine innovative contributions of the affective quality space to philosophy and psychology.

3.1 Determine contributions for philosophy

3.2 Determine contributions for psychology

3.3 Present at *CRE & EPSSE*

3.4 Manuscript writing and submission

2.5 Relevance and Impact

This project promises to deliver the first systematic mapping of affective quality space in the literature. This is a truly significant contribution as philosophers, by and large, have tended to rely primarily on introspection when theorizing about emotion experience. The affective quality space is a theoretical construct that is grounded in empirical work and empirically observable variables, moving affective experience into a naturalized picture of the mind. The project also has great relevance for the very empirical fields it will be informed by, for although affective quality spaces of different sorts exist in psychology, they have not been subjected to philosophical scrutiny nor have experimental agendas always been informed by clear theoretical aims. The project will result in a number of contributions to philosophy (to the philosophy of emotion, epistemology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology and neuroscience) and psychology itself, as existing experimental paradigms will be fine-tuned and novel experimental directions opened.

The main output of the project will take the form of articles for publication in top academic journals. The goal is to publish 4 papers, provisional titles include: ‘Towards an Affective Quality Space’, addressing aim 1 (target journal: *Analysis*), ‘Mapping the Affective Quality Space’, tackling aim 2 (target journal: *Mind*), ‘Normative implications of the Affective Quality Space’, addressing aim 3 on the implications of the quality space for the normative realm, including justification, (target journal: *Phil Studies*), ‘New Directions for the Experimental study of Emotion Experience’, addressing aim 3, regarding applications to empirical research (target journal: *Synthese*).

2.6 Relevance for personal career development

Pursuing this project will allow me to establish myself as a leader in my field, solidify a novel research expertise in philosophy of psychology and neuroscience, and bring me closer to my goal of securing a permanent academic position. Montreal is the top North American hub for interdisciplinary research on the emotions. Being immersed in this research environment will allow me opportunities for future collaborations (empirical and theoretical), as well as unparalleled opportunities to receive feedback on my work from philosophers as well as psychologists. This will result in cutting edge research outputs. My proposed main supervisor, Professor Tappolet, is specialist in meta-ethics and philosophy of emotion. She is one of the leading perceptual theorists of emotion world-wide and often takes an empirically informed approach in her work, collaborating with philosophers of psychology and neuroscience. Given her areas of expertise, Prof. Tappolet is uniquely well placed to act as my main supervisor. My host institution, the Centre de Recherche en Éthique, brings together philosophers working across 8 Universities. I look forward to engaging specifically with Prof. Ian Gold from McGill and Prof Luc Faucher, UQAM, two leading philosophers of psychology and neuroscience with research expertise on the emotions. It will be ideal to receive additional input from them regarding aim 2 of the project specifically.

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Statement of Mobility

Mobility is recognised as a necessary factor for a successful scientific or academic career. In order to assess the applicants' mobility concept, a statement of mobility is required. For details on the **concept of academic mobility**, see the guidelines of the corresponding funding scheme.

Dates must be entered in the format **mm.yyyy**. Leave non-applicable rows blank. It is possible to enter more than one activity per row. All entries must also be visible in the CV.

Applicant (last name, first name)	Funding Scheme	Submission deadline

1. Choice of research institution

Comment on the choice of your research institution (suitability to provide scientific support for your project, possibilities to develop your intellectual background and your scientific independence).

Research Institution	

2. List your past and planned mobility (if applicable) according to the following dimensions

Mobility dimensions	Dates (from – to; mm.yyyy – mm.yyyy)	Description (place, type of stay, etc.)	Added value for your research activities and scientific career
Institutional			
International			

Mobility dimensions	Dates (from – to; mm.yyyy – mm.yyyy)	Description (place, type of stay, etc.)	Added value for your research activities and scientific career
Sectorial			
Disciplinary			

Mobility dimensions	Dates (from – to; mm.yyyy – mm.yyyy)	Description (place, type of stay, etc.)	Added value for your research activities and scientific career
Intellectual			