



### Application Details

**Funding Opportunity:**

Banting Postdoctoral Fellowships Program 2021-09-22

Proposed Start Date (YYYY-MM-DD):

2022-04-01

**Applicant**

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Citizenship

Canadian

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Permanent Resident since Date :

**Area of Research**

Health

Natural Sciences and / or Engineering

Social Sciences and / or Humanities

**Title of Research Proposal**

Outlaw Emotions: Political Potential and Psychological Cost

**Host Institution**

Institution

Université de Montréal

Faculty

FACULTY OF ARTS AND  
SCIENCES

Department

PHILOSOPHY



**Lay title**

The Emotional Life of the Oppressed: Political Potential and Psychological Cost

**Lay Abstract**

Emotions have traditionally been opposed to reason. This view has been challenged in the past decades of research in the sciences and humanities, and for the most part abandoned. Crucially, this view was arguably informed by sexist ideology that denigrates the body and the emotions as inferior feminine attributes. Besides often being rational, emotions are sometimes more rational than an agent's explicit beliefs. Emotions sometimes clash with our beliefs and prompt us to reconsider them; they can act as better guides to knowledge and moral action than many of our beliefs. This is crucial under conditions of oppression where subjects have internalized oppressive beliefs. Emotions can clash with these oppressive beliefs and provide insight about injustices the agent would have otherwise lacked. Such emotions have been called 'outlaw emotions' because they go against prevailing norms and prompt agents to reconsider these norms. Outlaw emotions can play radical emancipatory roles by providing new insight, fueling moral action, and helping create new legal concepts such as 'sexual harassment' which arose through the shared discussion of women's emotional experiences. Despite their radical potential, we currently lack an account of what outlaw emotions are as well as how they represent the world and help generate new insight. My project fills this theoretical gap by providing the first account of outlaw emotions. In doing so it lays the foundations for them to play the radical political roles afforded them. In addition to having extreme political potential, outlaw emotions have health costs that have been drastically underestimated. I argue that these emotions help explain the disproportionate prevalence of particular psychiatric conditions in women, by accounting for specific clinical manifestations in Anxiety and Borderline disorders. Finally, I will argue that incorporating the notion of 'outlaw emotion' into therapeutic practices can improve treatment outcomes.

**Language in which proposal is written** English

**Keywords**

Philosophy of Emotion, Oppression, Feminism, Philosophy of Psychiatry, Psychiatric Ethics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

**Disciplines**

- |               |                              |
|---------------|------------------------------|
| 1- PHILOSOPHY | 2- INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES |
| 3- PSYCHOLOGY |                              |

**Areas of Research**

- |                         |                    |
|-------------------------|--------------------|
| 1- Philosophy of Health | 2- Women's Studies |
|-------------------------|--------------------|

**Temporal Period**

From	<input type="checkbox"/> BC <input type="checkbox"/> AD	To	<input type="checkbox"/> BC <input type="checkbox"/> AD
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<b>Geographical Regions</b>	
1- NORTH AMERICA	2-
<b>Countries</b>	
1-	2-
3-	4-
5-	



**Referees**

1. Last Name: Nanay	First Name: Bence	Middle Initial:
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Relationship to Applicant: Former employer	Current Position Title: Professor of Philosophy and BOF Research Professor
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Organization:  
Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp.  
Senior Research Associate, Peterhouse, University of Cambridge  
PI of ERC project 'Seeing Things You Don't See:  
Unifying the Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Multimodal Mental Imagery'

Department:

2. Last Name: Prinz	First Name: Jesse	Middle Initial:
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E-mail: jesse@subcortex.com

Relationship to Applicant: Arm's length referee	Current Position Held: Distinguished Professor of Philosophy
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Organization:  
City University of New York

Department:

3. Last Name: Srinivasan	First Name: Amia	Middle Initial:
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Relationship to Applicant: Mentor. I TA'd Prof. Srinivasan feminism courses.	Current Position Held: Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory
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Organization:  
All Souls College, University of Oxford

Department:



<b>Degree information</b>	
Degree Type: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PhD <input type="checkbox"/> PhD Equivalent	
Degree Name PhD Philosophy	
Institution University College London	Department Philosophy
Institution Country United Kingdom	Date completed or expected(YYYY-MM) 2019-08-01



**Certification Requirements:**

- Human subjects     
  Human stem cells     
  Animals     
  Biohazards  
 Environmental Impact     
  Containment Level \_\_\_\_\_

In order to carry out the proposed research in this application, an exemption from Health Canada under Section 56 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act is required. I agree to obtain an exemption from Health Canada to use the controlled substance for research purposes, as needed.

**Other Project Information**

For statistical purposes, does this application propose research involving Indigenous peoples?  Yes  No

Is sex as a biological variable taken into account in the research design, methods, analysis and interpretation, and/or dissemination of findings?  Yes  No

Is gender as a socio-cultural factor taken into account in the research design, methods, analysis and interpretation, and/or dissemination of findings?  Yes  No

Please describe how sex and/or gender considerations will be integrated into your research proposal or explain why sex and/or gender are not applicable to your research proposal:

Gender is a crucial element of my research proposal, in a number of ways: 1. My project contributes to the growing affective turn that vindicates the rationality of emotions which have been historically denigrated as irrational due to their association with the female. 2. I propose to investigate a class of emotions, 'outlaw emotions' which have been highlighted by feminist thinkers as holding radical political potential in granting knowledge about oppression and challenging it. My project will provide the first account of these emotions, such that they can play the political roles that have been afforded them. 3. My project will result in a deeper understanding of why certain psychiatric conditions occur disproportionately in women. 4. My project will contribute to anti-sexist, anti-racist and decolonizing efforts in psychiatry and clinical psychology by proposing that the notion of outlaw emotions be incorporated into psychiatric training and practices. 5. It will also suggest that some types of therapy (somatic and systemic) may be better suited to care for the mental health of oppressed groups.

**TITLE:** Outlaw Emotions: Political Potential and Psychological Costs

**OVERVIEW:** On a night out with a group of friends, part of Maria's body is suddenly squeezed by an unknown man. The concept of sexual harassment is yet to be developed and Maria's friends believe the man's action to be flattering. Maria shares these beliefs, but feels uncomfortable and angry. Maria's anger clashes with prevailing norms and can spark crucial insight that she may have otherwise missed due to having internalized oppressive beliefs. Further, by sharing her experience with other women, Maria's emotion can motivate vital conceptual progress, as well as political action, as was observed in consciousness raising efforts that led to the creation of the concept of sexual harassment and subsequent policy reform (Mackinnon 1979; Siegel 2003). Maria's anger is, I will argue, an *outlaw emotion* (hereafter OE). This term was coined by feminist philosopher Alison Jaggar (1989) to refer to emotions that are particularly promising in liberatory struggles. These are emotions 'distinguished by their incompatibility with the dominant perceptions and values' (166). They may 'enable us to perceive the world differently from its portrayal in conventional descriptions' (161). OEs are more often experienced by members of oppressed groups that have the most to lose from the status quo. A 1950s housewife, for example, arguably experiences OEs when, despite believing she is content, and often feeling pride regarding her household duties, nonetheless feels bouts of anger and sadness. OEs can often feel disorientating and alien to the emoting agent, as they are hard to make sense of from within society's prevailing norms. They are nonetheless thought to be a key first step in becoming aware of injustice (Friedman 1986; Jaggar 1989). The political value of OEs is acknowledged in both feminist literature and analytic philosophy of emotion (Fricker 1991; Tappolet 2014). Despite this however, accounts of what exactly OEs are, and how they are meant to play their radical roles, are almost entirely lacking. In the feminist literature, focus is on the applied value and political facets of these emotions, rather than on foundational issues within philosophy of emotion (Applebaum 2017; Burrow 2005). In the philosophy of emotion literature, on the other hand, theorizing typically abstracts away from oppressive conditions such that OEs have been almost entirely neglected. This has led to a significant gap in the literature whereby the claim that OEs can play important liberatory roles is often endorsed, yet accounts of these emotions that could support such a claim are lacking. My project is innovative in being the first to tackle this significant gap by proposing an account of OEs that explains their political potential. In addition to their radical potential, OEs have serious psychological costs that remain unexplored. It is acknowledged that OEs can be unpleasant and disorientating, and in extreme cases cause agents to question their sanity (Jaggar 1989), but there is reason to think that the psychological costs of OEs are far greater. OEs, I will argue, compromise the well-being of oppressed agents in a manner that constitutes a distinctive type of injustice, an affective injustice, by damaging capacities for emotion regulation. To mitigate affective injustice, we need to shift popular thinking on emotions through outreach and education. My project has the potential to inform anti-sexist, anti-racist and decolonial educational efforts (Coulter 1996; Hladki 1995; Jun 2016), including national Social-Emotional Learning (SEL) curricula (Jagers et al. 2018; Schlund et al. 2020) as well as outreach efforts that specifically target marginalized communities across Canada.

**RESEARCH PLAN AND METHODS:** Delivering an account of the political value of OEs requires foundational work that is currently lacking. If OEs are to grant insight we must ask three foundational questions: What characterizes OEs as a specific class of emotions? What do OEs make us aware of and how? and how might these emotions play knowledge-generating roles? The first stage of this project will be devoted to these crucial foundational questions, it will result in the first systematic account of OEs that explains the radical potential that has been advocated of them. Specifically, I will argue that OEs represent felt, as opposed to conceptual, clashes with dominant norms by picking up on considerations in a distinctive manner that bypasses our beliefs and reflection. This allows OEs to grant radical insight. However, the liberatory potential of OEs comes at a significant psychological cost that remains unexplored. Stage two of the project tackles this. My hypothesis is that the psychological cost of OEs is far greater than has been assumed: OEs can cause persistent evaluative conflict, or ambivalence, that can ultimately lead to deficits in emotion processing and regulation. This often constitutes a distinctive type of injustice: an affective injustice, that should be mitigated through educational efforts. My methodology will involve conceptual analysis, synthesis and scrutiny of existing theoretical and empirical work, hypothesis construction through systematic argumentation and evaluation of hypotheses through

consideration of objections as well as assessment in light of the following methodological constraints: empirical plausibility, and real-world plausibility. The former will involve thorough engagement with existing work across the affective sciences, while the latter will involve sensitivity to structural oppression by taking an intersectional feminist approach (Ahmed 2013; Crenshaw 1991; Zack 2007).

**STAGE 1: FOUNDATIONS FOR POTENTIAL**

**a) What are OEs?** The existing definition of OEs is unsatisfactory and needs to be made more precise. First, emotions can arguably be ‘outlaw’ from the subject’s own perspective or from society’s perspective alone. The former will be my focus. I will investigate how OEs compare to the more widely discussed class of ‘recalcitrant’ emotion (emotions that clash with an explicit belief the agent holds) (Brady 2009; Döring 2015). The clash in OEs is, I think, more severe as OEs go against an agent’s wider belief system. Secondly, the boundaries of the class of OEs are currently unclear. OEs seem also to occur beyond cases of oppression that will be my focus. For example, an individual committed to egalitarian ideology can experience misguided OEs of disgust towards a particular social group.

**b) What & how do OEs represent?** No investigation into the representational content of OEs currently exists. Most theorists take emotions to represent the world as being a certain way (Deonna & Teroni, 2012; Tappolet, 2016). It seems unlikely that OEs represent ‘conceptually’, or through the use of concepts: Maria, for example, need not possess the concept of sexual harassment, nor be able to apply the concept of ‘bad/wrong’, to the man’s actions, so as to experience anger. The claim that emotions involve ‘non-conceptual’ evaluative representations is widespread yet undertheorized (Döring 2009; Tappolet 2020). This is particularly problematic for OE cases as agents tend to lack relevant concepts. I will argue that OEs represent, in part, by how they subjectively feel. To test this proposal, I will construct an ‘affective quality space’ based on subjective emotional experiences. Such multidimensional ‘spaces’ have been constructed in philosophy and cognitive science for senses such as sight and smell, to explain the non-conceptual content of these experiences, but none has been constructed for affective experience (Gärdenfors 1996; Gauker 2017). I will rely on recent work in the affective sciences, on appraisal dimensions and the neuroscience of interoception, to construct my ‘affective quality space’ (Craig 2002; Scherer et al. 2006). This will result in an innovative framework for how emotions represent non-conceptually by how they feel.

**c) How do OEs yield radical epistemic insight?** Previous steps will deliver the first account of intentional OEs apt to play epistemic roles. Until my recent piece (forthcoming in *Ergo*), the literature assumed that the epistemic role of OEs is readily accounted for by existing accounts of the epistemology of emotions (Deonna and Teroni 2012; Tappolet 2014). I argued that this is not the case, such that we are left without an adequate account. Both the feminist and the philosophy of emotion literatures focus on how emotions provide justification, or evidence, for beliefs. In this project I will argue that we need to look beyond justification in OE cases, not least because conflicting oppressive beliefs are rampant in such cases which count as strong evidence against the OE. I will argue that emotions bear a distinctive relation to their reasons, such that emotions often allow us to respond to information we may have otherwise missed. My argument will be grounded in recent empirical work on the attentional dynamics of emotions, which supports the existence of a distinctively emotional way of information processing (Carretié 2014; Norris 2017). This allows OEs in particular to put agents in states of (often rational) ambivalence that are disorientating (Harbin 2016; Razinsky 2017). This ambivalence leaves the agent in a better epistemic position, where they are open to the force of different types of reasons or considerations, even when justification for beliefs based on OEs is blocked. Stage 1 will deliver OEs as non-conceptual representational states that can play distinctive epistemic roles by opening the agent up, through affective ambivalence, to the force of new reasons that may have otherwise been missed. This will account for how OEs play the crucial roles feminist philosophers have advocated of them. OEs can provide insight regarding oppression, as well as access to reasons for action, and act as the seeds for conceptual progress. The affective ambivalence caused by OEs can have dire psychological costs however, that remain uninvestigated.

**STAGE 2: UNJUST COSTS**

**a) What is an Affective Injustice?** So far, OEs have been considered unpleasant and disorientating experiences (Jaggar 1989), but the specific psychological costs of these emotions have not been investigated. I suspect that they are far more severe than previously assumed, as OEs, I will argue, can compromise the emotional well-being of oppressed groups in a manner that constitutes a distinctively *affective* injustice. I will characterize emotional well-being as involving not only




states of positive affect, but also well-functioning emotional capacities to respond appropriately to evaluative information and to regulate these responses in light of the subject's beliefs and desires (Crisp 2017; Haybron 2008; Nussbaum 2011). My hypothesis is that OEs compromise emotional well-being by contributing to dysfunctions in emotional regulation processing. Stage 1 proposes that OEs signal evaluative conflict by clashing with internalized oppressive beliefs. This evaluative conflict is hard to resolve given prevailing ideology. Persistent evaluative ambivalence may not only cause agents to endure negative experiences, such as anxiety and disorientation, but may compromise their ability to experience appropriate emotions, and regulate their intensity and duration. I will test this hypothesis against existing empirical work in the affective sciences. For example, it is plausible that OEs recruit the amygdala and the anterior cingulate cortex, key emotional conflict resolution brain areas (Etkin et al. 2006; Stevens et al. 2011). As the ambivalence in OE cases is hard to resolve, brain areas involved in emotional conflict resolution are plausibly continually recruited, which can cause chronic overactivation of these regions. Hyperactivity in these regions has been associated with impairments in emotion processing and regulation (Shin & Liberzon 2010; Veit et al. 2002). When these capacities are impaired, subjects miss and misinterpret important emotional information, and have trouble controlling their emotional responses, i.e. their emotional well-being is compromised. When this emotional deprivation disproportionately affects particular social groups, this constitutes an *affective injustice*. This type of injustice is in the very beginnings of being theorized (Archer & Mills 2019; Gallegos 2021; Srinivasan 2018; Whitney 2018). A number of affective injustices have recently been proposed, but none of them manage to establish a non-incidentally relation between the injustice and emotion. For example, Maria's ability to understand her OE of anger is compromised as dominant norms class the man's actions as flattering. Whitney (2018) considers this an affective injustice, but it is arguably a case of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) that happens to involve emotions. The harm seems to be epistemic: Maria is deprived of epistemic resources including concepts and capacities to apply them. For there to be a distinctively affective injustice, there must be deprivation in a specifically affective domain, which I argue is emotional well-being. By engaging in the first inquiry into the psychological costs of OEs, my project will deliver the first satisfactory account of affective injustice. **b) How to mitigate affective injustice?** Affective injustice can be addressed through education and outreach. Social-Emotional Learning (SEL) curricula, for example, construe emotions as pre-social phenomena that are independent from oppression and should be controlled. My project can help improve curricula by challenging all of these assumptions. In doing so, it can significantly contribute to constructing anti-sexist, anti-racist and decolonized SEL curricula (Jagers et al. 2018; Schlund et al. 2020). Similarly, my project can inform the content and methods of outreach efforts that specifically target marginalized communities across Canada by informing an interpretive framework that aims to harness the positive potential of OEs and minimize their psychological costs. Additionally, the dissemination of my project's results in popular outlets can help counter the dismissal of the emotions of marginalized groups in public discourse. The popular tropes of the 'angry feminist' and 'aggressive African American' attest to the rhetorical power such emotional dismissal can yield (Tomlinson 2010). These tropes have plausibly arisen partly because anger, as a protest against injustice, has historically been *outlawed* of women and African Americans, due to clashing with norms of subservience and inferiority.

**CONTINUITY WITH PAST RESEARCH:** The proposed project constitutes the next stage in a research program I have been developing over the last 5 years on the political value of emotions. My doctoral work provided a novel, empirically informed, account of anger that helps explain how the emotion can play radical practical and epistemic roles (Silva 2021a; 2021b; 2021c). As anger is the most paradigmatic response to injustices and harms, it will often occur as an OE under conditions of oppression as a first radical insight. My expertise on anger is therefore extremely relevant to an investigation of OEs. My project will provide an answer to the question set in my forthcoming piece in *Ergo*. In this paper I have taken the first steps towards bringing OEs into analytic focus. This piece was however mostly critical in that it critiqued existing accounts in the epistemology of emotions with regards to their ability to vindicate the epistemic roles feminist thinkers have advocated of OEs. The current project will take the next crucial steps by delivering an innovative, empirically informed, positive proposal for how OEs play such roles. In addition to this, the current project goes clearly beyond this initial paper

by theorizing the psychological costs of OEs for marginalized groups, especially women, and proposing that OEs often involve a distinctively affective type of injustice. Thorough engagement with work in neuroscience and psychology will be required to characterize this type of injustice. My expertise in feminist philosophy, empirical background (BSc Neuroscience, UCL, First Class Honors) and experience conducting interdisciplinary research make me ideally well placed to pursue this innovative project that has the potential to significantly inform education and outreach. The project is grounded in the same methodology that has guided my past research: not to abstract away from social reality, as is the custom in analytic philosophy of emotion, and to be informed by the most relevant work in the affective sciences.

### PROJECT TIMELINE:



**OUTPUTS:** The project will result in a book and 4 articles for dissemination in top outlets. Provisional articles include: ‘The Felt Structure of Emotional Content’, arguing that OEs put pressure on philosophers to provide better accounts of non-conceptual emotional content and proposing an empirically informed account to meet this challenge (target journal: *Mind*); ‘The Epistemic Fruits of Ambivalence’, arguing that OEs play radical epistemic roles by responding to reasons that beliefs often miss and affectively destabilizing agents (target journal: *Hypatia*); ‘What’s Affective about Affective Injustice?’ will propose that OEs can shed light on this novel type of injustice by helping characterize the distinctively emotional deprivation at stake (target journal: *Ethics*); ‘Outlaw Emotions: Key Concept for Inclusive Education’, exploring how OEs can inform anti-sexist, anti-racist and decolonial efforts in SEL curricula (target journal: *Journal of Applied Philosophy*). These papers will be presented at leading international conferences, including ISRE, and contribute to a monograph that shares the project’s title (target publisher: *OUP*). In addition to this, I will host flagship events, including a conference on ‘Oppression and Emotion’ at the beginning of the second year of the fellowship. I will also continue my demonstrated passion for public engagement, both in written pieces and outreach. I will collaborate with social intervention charity EXEKO, who’s director is a member of the CRÉ’s ‘committee of community experts’, to develop ways to bring the outputs of my work to marginalized communities across Canada.

**FIT WITH HOST INSTITUTION:** Having undergone a research exchange at the Center for Research on Ethics (CRÉ) in 2018, under the supervision of Prof. Tappolet, I know that the CRÉ is the perfect place to carry out the research project outlined. Prof. Tappolet, based at UdeM and director of the CRÉ, is one of the top philosophy of emotion experts worldwide, with expertise in emotion theory, moral psychology and ethics. Having also been a PI on an SSHRC funded project on well-being, Prof. Tappolet is uniquely well-placed to act as my main supervisor. Based at the CRÉ I will be immersed in an unparalleled environment that brings together researchers working across diverse fields in Ethics. My project fits squarely within two of the center’s main research axes: Fundamental Ethics and Political Ethics, and contributes to the center’s focal research themes on Feminist Ethics and Anti-racism & Decolonization. I will be particularly keen to engage with Prof. Ryoa Chung, based at UdeM and co-director of Feminist Ethics at CRÉ. Crucially, as empirical work is central to my theorizing at every single stage of the project, and empirical feasibility is one of my guiding methodological constraints, I plan to work with Prof. Ian Gold as my secondary supervisor. Prof. Gold is a member of the CRÉ, a specialist in philosophy of neuroscience, and the PI of an interdisciplinary cognitive neuroscience lab at McGill University that conducts research on emotion as well as on psychological function across diverse communities. This makes Prof. Gold the ideal co-supervisor. Working with Prof. Gold will allow me to closely engage with researchers producing exactly the type of work that my project will be informed by. This will allow me to conduct privileged interdisciplinary research of the highest caliber, making the combined supervision proposed for this postdoctoral project unmatched.

## Significance of Leadership Contributions

Director: University College London MAP (Minorities and Philosophy) Chapter, 2016-2019

MAP's mission is to address structural injustices in academic philosophy and to remove barriers that impede participation in our discipline for members of marginalized groups. As director of UCL's MAP chapter I founded a committee to help run our various initiatives, these included; lobbying for inclusive syllabi, instating an annual workshop on inclusive teaching practices as part of our department's teacher-training program, raising TA pay, running a fortnightly reading group on topics including race, gender, class and sexuality, hosting open discussion forums with members of marginalized groups to workshop innovative solutions, and founding an annual public lecture and graduate masterclass on MAP related topics. The annual 'Harriet and Helen Memorial Lecture' and graduate masterclass, is now a department staple and has made available, to a public audience of over 1000 people so far, critical thinking on key social issues that are typically at the fringe of analytic philosophy. The lecture is named in honour of the unacknowledged contributions of John Stuart Mills' wife and step daughter to his work, as well as in honour of all invisible contributions to philosophy that have been made by minority groups.

Volunteer Consultant: Alternative's Trust Women's Charity, London, 2018

In an effort to put my research skills to practical use, as well as deepen my knowledge and practice in empowering marginalized groups, I volunteered for a pilot initiative run by UCL's public engagement unit where researchers were paired with non-profit sector organizations that fit their interests and expertise. Alternative's Trust is a small charity that provides long-term intensive support to vulnerable women and their families in East London. They provide a range of services including: free legal counsel (most often to help undocumented women from the global south secure residency), translation services, psychological counseling, sex education, day care services and a food bank. Besides volunteering, over 9 months, in the activities of the Trust (often putting my language skills in Portuguese and French to use), I collaborated with 3 researchers from different disciplines to provide consultancy on how best to measure and communicate the varied and holistic nature of the Trust's services to potential funders. We developed a conscientious evaluation framework that quantified support across various domains and put together a related 'qualitative package' that included photos, testimonials and footage. Our consultancy directly helped the Trust secure its largest funding ever: **£120,000** from Lloyds Bank Foundation.

Conference planning and organization: 'The Social Dimensions of Emotion' at 2019 International Society for Research on Emotions (ISRE), University of Amsterdam.

ISRE is the flagship conference in my field, bringing together hundreds of researchers across the sciences and humanities working on the emotions. Every conference begins with one-day 'pre-conferences' on topics within a particular discipline (philosophy, psychology, neuroscience etc.). These are selected by competitive peer-review that is fiercer than individual talk and symposia review, as there is typically only one pre-conference per discipline. In 2019, I was the lead applicant for a Philosophy pre-conference on 'The Social Dimensions of Emotion', bringing together leading emotion theorists and emerging researchers to discuss ways in which the 'social' (ex: context, structural oppression, presence of other individuals) influences, or should influence, our theorizing. This has been a direly neglected topic. My proposal was the only Philosophy pre-conference selected for ISRE 2019 and I was the most junior applicant to plan, organize and deliver a pre-conference. I was interviewed by artist Emilio Moreno, who attended my pre-conference, as a leading thinker on the political potential of emotions for his project 'Emotional' funded by the Spanish Center for Contemporary Culture. The pre-conference also prompted a group of young researchers, including myself, to found the *Critical Emotion Theory Network*, concerned with socially engaged theorizing and determining possible political applications of emotion research.

## Significance of Research Contributions

Silva, Laura (in press) 'The Epistemic Role of Outlaw Emotions' *Ergo*

*Ergo* is widely considered one of the top journals in analytic philosophy, as well as a leader in open access and ethical review procedures. It has an acceptance rate of 12%. In this paper I argue that existing accounts of how emotions play epistemic, or knowledge-generating, roles risk ruling out cases of 'outlaw emotions' which feminist philosophers have long highlighted to be of extreme epistemic value. Outlaw emotions are ones that clash with an agent's internalized oppressive beliefs and can spark radical insight about injustice. I argue that we currently lack an account for how these emotions play such radical epistemic roles. My paper represents the first treatment of outlaw emotions in my field, the philosophy of emotion, and positions these emotions as a central and important topic of research. This piece has already had a significant impact: leaders, as well as early career researchers, in my field have begun to work on this topic, citing my paper as foundational, two publishers (Palgrave Macmillan and Rowan & Littlefield) contacted me following my presentation of the paper at the American Philosophical Association to discuss book projects, and I was invited to found the *Critical Emotion Theory Network*. Through presentations (6 prominent peer-reviewed conferences, 2 invited talks) I have established myself as a rising leader in socially and politically engaged analytic philosophy of emotion. Part of this research was conducted as a visiting researcher at the University of Montreal, working with Professor Tappolet.

Silva, Laura (2021) 'Anger and its Desires' *European Journal of Philosophy* (online first)

*EJP* is a widely renowned top philosophy journal with an average acceptance rate of 10%. In this piece I provide the first sustained critique of the orthodox view of anger, which takes the emotion to be constitutively tied to desires for retribution or revenge. The orthodox view is widespread across philosophy, academia in general, as well as dominant in our everyday folk psychological concept of anger. My critique therefore has wide-ranging implications by calling into question an extremely widespread view of anger. I begin by dissecting the implicit empirical commitments contained within the orthodox view, and then proceed to challenge them each in turn by appeal to experimental evidence across the brain and behavioural sciences. My undergraduate degree in Neuroscience makes me ideally placed to conduct such innovative interdisciplinary research. I have been invited to present this paper in 4 countries, as well as invited as a guest lecturer on anger at the University of Copenhagen. This paper has contributed to establishing me as a rising interdisciplinary philosopher of emotion. Part of this research was conducted as a visiting researcher at Yale University, working with Professor Joshua Knobe.

Silva, Laura (2021) 'Is Anger a Hostile Emotion?' *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* (online first)

*Review of Philosophy and Psychology* is a top specialist journal run by Institut Jean Nicod, distinguished for interdisciplinary research. Having been reviewed by both a philosopher and a psychologist, my paper is considered a significant contribution to both disciplines. In it, I propose a more radical argument against the orthodox view of anger, targeting Martha Nussbaum, amongst others. Crucially, my paper diagnoses the orthodox view as informed and maintained by unjust features of social reality. Orthodox/Retributive views of anger perpetuate its dismissal and serve to maintain the power structures that trigger the emotion in oppressed groups. Empirical work suggests that anger becomes hostile when oppressed agents have exhausted communicative efforts and have little to lose. In this sense, the orthodox view contributes to its own veracity by sustaining social conditions that in effect turn anger hostile. This paper is innovative in argument, methodology (relying on historical evidence that both analytic philosophy and psychology tend to ignore), and outcome (social injustices have likely structured our folk concept of anger).